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BENCHMARKS: JUDGES ON TRIAL, JUDICIAL
SELECTION AND ELECTION
Lawrence M. Friedman*
In most American states when the citizens go to the polls they will
find, along with candidates for state and federal officers, a list of
judges they are expected to vote on. In a number of states, such as
Texas and West Virginia, these are regular partisan elections-Repub-
licans running against Democrats.1 In nineteen states, the elections of
at least some judges are supposed to be nonpartisan.2 In another sev-
enteen states, judges run in uncontested elections, where voters are
only asked to say yes or no to the candidate-do we keep this judge in
office or send him or her to the showers? 3 California holds judicial
elections and uses both nonpartisan contested elections and nonparti-
san retention elections. 4 In about a dozen states, the judges are ap-
pointed or have life tenure. These states are outnumbered by about a
margin of three to one. In election states, typically, all judges face
some sort of election, from the state supreme court on down. There
are forty-one states with intermediate appellate courts; all but seven-
teen of them hold some sort of election.5 In addition, in thirty out of
fifty states trial court judges also stand for election in some manner.6
The American system is unique. To most foreign lawyers, legal
scholars, and ordinary citizens, the idea of electing judges is about as
strange as electing doctors, nurses, or police officers would be. How is
the public supposed to decide whether a person is qualified to be a
judge or whether Candidate A is better than Candidate B? Most for-
* Marion Rice Kirkwood Professor of Law, Stanford University. I wish to thank Scott Shack-
elford for his help with the research for this Article.
1. See ROGER K. WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, STATE JUDICIAL ELEC-
TIONS: THE POLARIZATION OF AMERICA'S COURTS 4 (Nov. 2006), available at http://www.court
info.ca.gov/jc/documents/State JudElections.Warren.pdf.
2. Id. at 5.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. LARRY C. BERKSON, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE
UNITED STATES: A SPECIAL REPORT 3 (Aug. 2004), available at http://www.ajs.org/selection/
docs/Berkson.pdf.
6. WARREN, supra note 1, at 4.
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eigners no doubt would consider the election of sheriffs and district
attorneys even weirder than the election of judges.
Where did this notion of electing judges come from? Certainly not
from England, mother country of the common law. All British judges
are appointed, and no European country elects judges. The elective
principle is an American innovation.
Historically, the U.S. system for judicial elections dates from the
first half of the nineteenth century. Most people will recall the politi-
cal storm in the early Republic over the conduct of federal judges-
judges who had life tenure appointments. When Thomas Jefferson
took office, all the judges were naturally Federalists appointed by
George Washington and his successor, John Adams. Jefferson felt he
was saddled with these judges with no relief in sight: "Few die and
none resign."' 7 These judges, he felt, were partisan and biased-a gen-
uine thorn in his side.8 The attempt to impeach Samuel Chase, a Jus-
tice of the Supreme Court, was the high point-or low point-of the
struggle against the Federalist judges. This attempt failed narrowly.
But the political elite of Jefferson's party remained convinced that
Federalist judges were not objective decision makers: they were
blindly partisan political actors.
Partisanship and prejudice, of course, seem to be bad things. The
ideal judge is supposed to be honest and impartial. Judges do in fact
make policy. And, arguably, policy making is unavoidable. It is a part
of the job and part of the very nature of deciding cases. On the other
hand, the United States aspired to be a democracy-an experiment in
popular sovereignty. The people were to rule through the ballot box.
All policy makers, then, should be ultimately responsive to the people.
The judges, however, were not responsive. This must have seemed
like a flaw in the system. To guarantee that judges made the kind of
policy that the public wanted, to make sure that the will of the people
really was sovereign, judges, like other public officials, ought to be
subject to the popular will. To be sure, the movement to elect judges
was far from simple; a number of strands in American history fed into
it.9 But ultimately, the ideology of popular sovereignty lay behind the
movement.
7. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Elias Shipman (July 12, 1801), available at http://www.
gilderlehrman.org/search/collection-pdfs/00/96/4/00964.pdf (Jefferson's actual quote, from a let-
ter of 1801, was as follows: "Those by death are few; by resignations, none.").
8. Id.
9. See generally Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on Trial: State Constitutional Reform and the
Rise of an Elected Judiciary, 1846-1860, 45 HISTORIAN 337 (1983); Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evalua-
tion of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37
Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 190 (1993).
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The elective system swept across the country. Georgia in 1812 and
Indiana in 1816 provided for popular election of some of their
judges.10 In 1832, Mississippi provided for popular election of all its
judges, as did New York in its 1846 constitution.' From then on, vir-
tually every new state provided for election of judges.12 The zeal for
elections was, in those days, even broader than it is today. In the early
nineteenth century, for example, the rank and file in some state mili-
tias elected their officers. 13
Elections, then, were the distinctive American solution to the prob-
lem of judicial power. The European solution was in some ways the
opposite. In Europe, the chosen solution was to reduce the judges, as
much as possible, to technocrats, to mere civil servants. Judges were
bound in theory to follow the rules laid down by the legislature in
codes and statutes and were absolutely forbidden to innovate or make
policy.14 Whether this is the way things actually worked out in civil
law countries is, of course, quite a different question.
And what was the actual result of the American system? That too
is an open question. It is hard to know how one would measure "suc-
cess." Did elections make the judges more responsive to the public?
And if elections did have this effect, was it good for society or not?
There are no real answers to these questions. Does the public even
show much of an interest? For most elections the answer is no. Did
the voters ever throw judges out of office? Yes, but not that often. In
California, between 1850 and 1920, only 14.3% of the judges who left
office left because they lost their bid for re-election; another 3.6%
"[flailed of renomination at [a] convention or party primary. 1 5 It is
hard to say whether this is a lot or a little or what it meant for the legal
system or for society. In any event, the classic period of judicial elec-
tions lasted a surprisingly short time. By the end of the nineteenth
century, a great deal of skepticism had crept in. This was now an ur-
ban, industrial society, millions of immigrants poured into the country,
and big city machines dominated the local political landscape in many
10. BERKSON, supra note 5, at 1.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art IV, § 1 (1821), reprinted in 1 CHARLES Z. LINCOLN, THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 202 (1905) ("Captains, subalterns, and non-commissioned
officers shall be chosen by written votes of the members of their respective companies.").
14. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PEREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 39-40 (3d ed.
2007).
15. Kermit L. Hall, Progressive Reform and the Decline of Democratic Accountability: The
Popular Election of State Supreme Court Judges, 1850-1920, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 345, 363
tbl.4.
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places. In some cities, these machines were notoriously corrupt. The
elites-leaders of the bar and others-had become deeply suspicious
of judicial elections. These elections, they felt, chiefly brought politi-
cal hacks and machine politicians to the bench. For the elites of the
bar, democracy was the problem, not the solution, at least as far as
judges were concerned. The result was a long-term movement to re-
form the elective system-a movement that tended to retain the form
but not the substance of these elections. As Kermit Hall explained,
this was a shift from "democratic accountability" to "professional
account ability."16
The attack on popular control of judges achieved a good deal of
success. Many states changed their laws about judicial selection. In
most of them, the essence of the new system was this: typically, a
judge would go on the bench through appointment. For example, the
governor might be required to appoint from a list provided by the
organized bar, and on the next election day, the new judge would run
for re-election without any real opponent. Voters would just vote yes
or no. Presumably, they would always vote yes, on the theory that
you can't beat somebody with nobody. Unfortunately, every once in a
while nobody does in fact beat somebody. But this was not expected
to happen very often.
California was one of the states that adopted this general type of
plan. In 1911, the legislature established a system of nonpartisan elec-
tions for judges. 17 In 1926, a constitutional amendment provided for
these elections, and in 1934, voters approved an initiative measure
that dealt with the selection of appellate judges. 18 Today, under the
constitution, the governor nominates judges of the state supreme
court and the courts of appeals, and they are confirmed by the com-
mission on judicial appointments, which consists of the chief justice,
the attorney general, and a presiding justice of the courts of appeals.19
Since 1979, the legislature has required a thorough investigation of the
background and qualifications of prospective nominees. 20 A commis-
sion on judicial nominees of the state bar conducts the investigation.
16. Id. at 350. "Democratic accountability" refers to the "ability of the public to assert control
over.., judicial policy making." Id. "Professional accountability" reflects, instead, the view that
"the law is a separate authority with its own internal criteria," responsible to the bar, as the
"repository of professional expertise." Id.
17. AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY: HISTORY OF REFORM EFFORTS, http://www.judicial
selection. us/judicial-selection/reformefforts/formalchanges.sincejinception.cfm?state= (last
visited Mar. 20, 2009).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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The governor, however, is not bound by the commission's recommen-
dations. Appellate judges, who serve twelve year terms, must stand
for retention at the next gubernatorial election after their appoint-
ment. Superior court judges are chosen in non-partisan elections for
six year terms.
The California governor fills vacancies on the superior court (the
basic trial court) by appointment. As with appellate court appoint-
ments, the commission on judicial nominees must first investigate pro-
spective nominees. The vast majority of superior court judges initially
reach the bench by way of appointment; once on the bench, they
rarely lose. In short, California is committed to a system which, in
form, gives the people the power to decide. In practice, however, the
governor and other elected officials dominate the process of choosing
the judges.
The governor's choices and those of the profession are, of course,
deeply colored by politics. There is also no hard evidence that merit
selection really produces better judges. A judge's quality is something
that in essence cannot be measured: studies suggest that the creden-
tials of merit judges are much the same as the credentials of judges
selected in some other way.21 Still, formally at least, merit selection is
a far cry from the system set up in the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Moreover, in many states where judges are elected, the elections
are officially non-partisan. Judges do not carry party labels. How
"non-partisan" these elections really are is another question.22
The point was to avoid partisan squabbles. For the most part, the
system seemed to work. In most states, judges rarely got in trouble
with the voters. A study in 1987, which looked at ten states, found
only twenty-two defeats out of 1865 elections (less than one per-
cent). 23 Other studies, with even larger sample sizes (one with 3912),
came to similar conclusions. In 1998, not a single sitting judge was
defeated, and between 1964 and 1999, only fifty-two judges out of
4588 were defeated. It is important, however, to distinguish between
judicial elections in general and elections for state supreme courts. A
study of these courts found that 8.3% of the judges were defeated
between 1980 and 1994.24 This is not an insignificant number.
21. Melinda Gann Hall, State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probing the Myths of
Judicial Reform, 95 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 315, 316 (2001).
22. See Roy A. Schotland, To the Endangered Species List, Add: Nonpartisan Judicial Elec-
tions, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1397 (2003).
23. B. Michael Dann & Randall M. Hansen, Judicial Retention Elections, 34 Loy. L.A. L.
REV. 1429, 1430 (2001).
24. Hall, supra note 21, at 319 tbls.4 & 5.
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Here the type of election made a difference. In partisan elections,
18.8% of the incumbents lost,25 in nonpartisan elections, 8.6%, and in
retention elections, only 1.7%.26 In 2000, eight percent of the incum-
bents in nonpartisan elections for state supreme court were defeated;
in retention elections no incumbents lost, and in partisan elections, an
astonishing 45.5% of incumbents went down to defeat.27 After Cali-
fornia adopted the retention system of elections in 1934, not a single
justice of the supreme court was defeated until 1986.28 In that year,
over eleven million dollars was spent on the campaign to defeat cer-
tain judges-successfully, as it turned out. Chief Justice Rose Bird
lost her job, and carried two other justices down to defeat. 29 Still, at
the time, this election seemed to be a fairly isolated event. Rose Bird
was an unusually controversial figure, and since her defeat other at-
tempts to unseat justices in California have not been successful.
But is the tide turning once again? Are elections becoming more
partisan, more contested? In recent years, serious campaigns have
been mounted to defeat sitting judges in some states. Interest groups
have mobilized to fight against judges whose opinions they disliked-
opinions on controversial topics such as abortion or the death penalty
or, more to the point, on products liability, worker's compensation, or
labor issues in general. These efforts are by no means always success-
ful, but in some egregious cases justices have lost bitterly contested
elections-including retention elections.30 In 2004, state supreme
court justices faced opposition in eighteen of the twenty states that
had contested elections. In partisan contests, almost a quarter of the
sitting judges were thrown out of office, and many of the contests have
been rather close. 31 The winners in contested elections have had, on
average, about fifty-seven percent of the vote, which is lower than the
average for contested seats in the House of Representatives. 32
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Melinda Gann Hall, Competition as Accountability in State Supreme Court Elections, in
RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS 165, 177 tbl.9.4 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007) [hereinafter RUNNING FOR JUDGE].
28. Id.
29. Frank Clifford, Voters Repudiate 3 of Court's Liberal Justices, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1986, at
Al.
30. In 2005, voters in Pennsylvania were extremely angry that the legislature had given itself
and the judges a pay raise. Supreme Court Justice Russell Nigro lost his retention election that
year. He had nothing to do with the pay raise, but he was up for re-election and bore the brunt
of the public anger. Matthew J. Streb, The Study of Judicial Elections, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE,
supra note 27, at 11.
31. WARREN, supra note 1, at 6.
32. Deborah Goldberg, Craig Holman & Samantha Sanchez, How 2000 Was a Watershed Year
for Big Money, Special Interest Pressure, and TV Advertising in State Supreme Court Campaigns,
[Vol. 58:45.1
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There is strong evidence that judicial elections all over the country
are becoming more contentious. One sure sign of this trend is the
amount of money spent on judicial campaigns. At one time, most
judges up for re-election posted a filing fee, and then spent almost
nothing else on their campaigns. In 2000, however, state supreme
court candidates, nationwide, raised a total of $45.6 million for judicial
elections, a sixty-one percent increase over the amount raised by can-
didates in 1998.33 Lawyers and business interests accounted for forty-
nine percent of all contributions to supreme court candidates. 34 Those
relatively few states that still have partisan judicial elections show the
most spending for campaigning; candidates raised an average of
$380,724 between 1990 and 2000-as opposed to an average of
$107,388 raised by supreme court candidates in nonpartisan elec-
tions.35 It is a bit unsettling to consider that even "nonpartisan elec-
tions" need this much money. A 1995 study of contested elections to
the Los Angeles County Superior Court indicated that median spend-
ing had risen from $3000 in 1976 to $70,000 in 1994.36 During the
same period, median spending by incumbents increased from $1000 to
$95,000. 37 The candidates themselves are the largest source of funding
for superior court judges. Attorneys and law firms make up the next
largest group of contributors, accounting for nearly one fourth of the
funds raised by the candidates.38
Trial lawyers and business groups are also spending more on unreg-
ulated "issue advertisements" in judicial elections. The Litigation
Fairness Campaign, sponsored by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
and the Business Roundtable, hoped to raise twenty-five million dol-
lars, primarily for television advertisements, in at least eight states
holding supreme court elections in 2002.39 Trial lawyer organizations
and unions in "battleground" judicial election states have been spend-
ing significant amounts as well. Groups that do not expressly call for
the election or defeat of a candidate are not required to disclose what
they spend; for this reason, it is impossible to know exactly how much
NEW POL. JUD. ELECTIONS, Feb. 2002, at 12 fig.6, available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/
JASMoneyReport.pdf.
33. Id. at 4.
34. Id. at 9 fig.3.
35. Id. at 12 fig.6
36. American Judicature Society, Judicial Campaigns and Elections: California, http://www.
judicialselection.us/judicial-selection/campaigns-and-eectins/ampaign-financing.cfm?state=
ca (last visited Mar. 20, 2009).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Peter H. Stone, The Blitz to Elect Business-Friendly Judges, 34 NAT'L J. 480 (2002).
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interest groups are spending on these elections.40 More recent data
shows clearly that more and more money is being spent. There are
more television ads. And a large number of these ads are negative-
attacks on the integrity or judgment of a judicial candidate.41
The problem, in other words, is more than money. The problem is
what the money is spent for and how it is spent. Also, the problem is
the growing nastiness and partisanship. 42 To be sure, most judicial
elections are still uneventful, even boring, but the exceptions are
troubling. In 2004, Democrat Warren McGraw, a justice of the West
Virginia Supreme Court, lost his seat to Republican Brent Benjamin.
McGraw had been "targeted by mining executives, business interests
and physicians groups. ' 43 A single donor, Don Blankenship, chief ex-
ecutive of a coal company, gave $1.7 million to the campaign against
McGraw.44 The anti-McGraw forces ran a series of ads against him.
In one ad, he was criticized for being part of the majority decision in a
case that granted extended probation to a man convicted of molesting
his half-brother.4 5 Blankenship got the judge and the decision he
wanted; and the issue of whether the decision was fatally tainted is
now before the United States Supreme Court.4 6
There are other examples of nasty campaigns. In a 1996 election in
Alabama, a television ad "even portrayed a candidate as a skunk,"
and a Wisconsin justice was "portrayed as 'pro-child molester' by her
opponent."47 Also, in 2008 Justice Louis Butler of the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin lost his seat to Martin Gableman. In this bitter cam-
paign, Gableman's ads suggested that Butler, an African American,
had helped an African American rapist go free. The real force behind
the campaign was a local business group, which hated the court's rul-
40. Id.
41. See James Sample, Lauren Jones & Rachel Weiss, How 2006 Was the Most Threatening
Year, Yet to the Fairness and Impartiality of Our Courts-and How Americans are Fighting Back,
NEW POL. JUD. ELECTIONS, 2006, at 1, available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/49c18b6cb18960b2f9-
z6m62gwji.pdf.
42. See generally G. Alan Tarr, Politicizing the Process: The New Politics of State Judicial
Elections, in BENCH PRESS: THE COLLISION OF COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE MEDIA 52 (Keith J.
Bybee ed., 2007) [hereinafter BENCH PRESS].
43. Carol Morello, W. Va. Supreme Court Justice Defeated in Rancorous Contest, WASH. POST,
Nov. 4, 2004, at A15.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Robert Barnes, Case May Define When a Judge Must Recuse Self, WASH. POST, Mar. 2,
2009, at A01.
47. Morello, supra note 43.
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ings in product liability cases and was anxious to replace justices who
were considered too liberal.48
If the trend continues, it would represent a historic shift in judicial
elections and in American political life. It would be, of course, a re-
turn to democratic accountability. This is one way of putting it-a
fairly bland and favorable way. But many people and certainly most
judges do not think the judicial system needs democratic accountabil-
ity. They feel that injecting raw, partisan politics into this area puts
partisan politics in a place where it does not belong. In 2006, although
in California the supreme court justices kept their seats, along with all
fifty-one court of appeals judges, there was a disturbing development
at the level of the superior court. A "bagel shop owner with limited
legal experience" defeated a "well-regarded sitting judge" in the pri-
mary,49 leading Chief Justice George to remark that "the rule of law is
in jeopardy" if the "judiciary becomes politicized." 50
Of course, the judiciary is politicized and always has been. Judges
are policy makers, have always been policy makers, and always will
be. Men and women who go before the Senate, hoping for a seat on
the federal bench, usually insist nowadays that they have never, in a
sense, lost their mental virginity; they claim to have no ideas, atti-
tudes, or prejudices, and announce that they will decide cases as they
arise, strictly according to law. They disavow any notion that judges
make law, make policy, or reach any decisions not strictly dictated by
legal logic. But no serious scholar believes them. And more and
more members of the public, whatever their normative stance, are
acutely aware of the power of judges to make law, make policy, or in
any event make a difference. It is probably enough to mention Roe v.
Wade, or Bush v. Gore.51
Making policy is one thing; making policy to suit campaign donors is
another. Here the public shows some signs of disquiet. In one poll,
seventy-six percent of voters and twenty-six percent of state judges
felt that contributions to campaign war chests of judges had an influ-
ence on judicial decisions.52 Most voters also feel that in the United
48. See Torts and Courts, ECONOMIST, Apr. 12, 2008, at 36; Adam Liptak, Rendering Justice,
With One Eye on Re-Election, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2008, at Al.
49. Jessica Garrison, In Judicial Races, the Status Quo Prevails, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, at
B4.
50. Harriet Chang, State Chief Justice Heads Off Opponents, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 17, 1998, at
A17.
51. See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
52. Letter from Stan Greenberg, Chairman and CEO, Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research,
and Linda A. DiVall, President, American Viewpoint, to Geri Palast, Executive Director, Justice
at Stake Campaign (February 14, 2002), http://justiceatstake.org/files/pollingsummaryfinal.pdf
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States, there is one system of justice for the rich and powerful, and
another for the rest of us. Nine out of ten voters, and eight out of ten
state judges, said they are quite concerned about special interest
groups who buy advertising trying to influence the outcomes of judi-
cial elections.53 One judge, in an interview, said he had "never felt so
much like a hooker down by the bus station," as he did in a judicial
race.
54
The President appoints Justices to the United States Supreme
Court. The public knows that a lot depends on who sits on the court.
The power to appoint Justices has even been an issue in recent presi-
dential elections. Of course, many people, perhaps even most people,
are willing to believe that "activist judges" are a bad thing; that judges
should stick to "the law" and refrain from making policy. But ironi-
cally, even those people, and perhaps especially those people, seem
quite committed to a political process in choosing justices. They tend
to vote for candidates who promise to appoint or promote judges who
are "strict constructionists." Sometimes they are willing to punish
"activists" at the ballot box. Most of the time "activist" is a code word
for "liberal." But the very fear of "activist judges," along with horror
at the idea that politics has invaded the judicial world, leads to an
increase in contested elections. This means more money and more
controversy and makes more salient the very problem conservatives
say they are trying to avoid.
A regime of hotly contested, feverish judicial elections is dangerous
in two ways that distort the role of the judge. The first danger is that
judges, facing or fearing opposition, will shy away from decisions that
might make trouble at the polls. The second is that the judges are
forced to campaign, but campaigning costs money and money cor-
rupts. Even judges who are not in much danger feel they have to raise
money for a "pre-emptive strike," as Chief Justice George of Califor-
nia put it in 1998.55 The chief justice was afraid that a controversial
decision he joined would lead to a campaign against him.56 Judges,
then, feel they must beg for money from donors. What do the donors
get in return? A study of Wisconsin claimed to find that one group of
[hereinafter Letter from Stan Greenberg & Lynda A. Divall to Geri Palast]. In another poll, an
overwhelming majority (more than eighty percent) thought that "the partisan background of
judges influences court decisions either some or a lot." Keith J. Bybee, Introduction: Two Faces
of Judicial Power, in BENCH PRESS, supra note 42, at 1, 3.
53. Letter from Stan Greenberg & Lynda A. Divall to Geri Palast, supra note 52.
54. Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court's Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006. at Al.
55. Chang, supra note 50.
56. Id.
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contributors (lawyers) essentially got nothing: lawyers who donated
money were no more likely to win cases than lawyers who did not.57
But this was a single study of a single state. Other studies point in a
different direction. A 2006 study conducted by the New York Times
claimed that justices of the Ohio Supreme Court voted overwhelming
in favor of donors in cases that came before them.58 One justice voted
on the side of contributors ninety-one percent of the time.59 The Ohio
justices insisted that the money made no difference. 60 This is certainly
possible. After all, the judges can claim, perhaps plausibly, that they
simply tended to agree ideologically with their donors. But is this re-
ally the case? A more recent study, in Louisiana, compared cases in-
volving donors to similar cases that involved no donation. 61 The study
concluded that the money was crucial: it was "the donation, not the
underlying philosophical orientation," that accounted for the out-
comes of cases.62 And, of course, some are troubled by the very possi-
bility that in the future some judges will bend and twist the decision-
making process.
There is no doubt that judicial elections, or at least some of them,
are getting more expensive and more strident. Attacks on sitting
judges, as we have seen, are at times quite unfair. Justice McGraw in
West Virginia was essentially accused of being soft toward child mo-
lesters. This was bad enough in itself. The groups mounting the cam-
paign, moreover, probably cared very little about what happened to
child molesters. Rather, they hated McGraw's pro-labor, liberal deci-
sions. The same was true of the Wisconsin campaign that cost Justice
Butler his job. And Justice Rose Bird no doubt lost her seat because
the public was told, over and over again, how she thwarted the will of
the people in death penalty cases. Millions were spent to defeat her,
but the death penalty is not an issue that loosens the purse strings of
big business groups.63
57. Damon M. Cann, Campaign Contributions and Judicial Behavior, 23 AM. REV. POL. 261
(2002). There was some suggestion in this study that "justices are sensitive to the sources of their
campaign funds" and might tend to recuse themselves. Id. at 270.
58. Liptak & Roberts, supra note 54.
59. Id.
60. Adam Liptak, Looking Anew at Campaign Cash and Elected Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
2008, at A14.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. To be sure, police groups did contribute to the defeat of Justice Rose Bird. See Greg
Braxton, Burbank Police Group Donates $1,000 to Drive to Unseat Bird, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27,
1986, at G10. The police called her "soft on criminals," and with "no apparent compassion for
the victims of crime." Id. But the big money came from business groups and they were behind
the campaign in the first place.
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Most examples of nasty and negative campaigns come from con-
servative groups. In theory, the left can play the smear game as well.
In fact, this happens once in a while. In an Illinois race, in 2004, ads
attacking Lloyd Karmeier claimed that "[m]ulti-national corporations,
HMOs and the insurance industry are spending millions to buy Lloyd
Karmeier a seat on the Supreme Court. . . They know Lloyd
Karmeier will continue to support them as they outsource American
jobs and eliminate healthcare for workers and retirees." 64 In any
event, two wrongs do not make a right. And the overwhelming major-
ity of attacks come from conservatives. In 2006, eighty-five percent of
the "special interest television advertisements" in state supreme court
races "were sponsored by groups on the political right."' 65 In the long
run, it is unhealthy for judicial campaigns to be as dirty and expensive
as campaigns for seats in Congress, and it is unhealthy for them to be
so biased in one direction. Business groups and other groups on the
right are pouring millions of dollars into judicial campaigns in order to
get judges on the bench who see things their way. Perhaps the single
biggest issue for these groups is "tort reform." They want judges who
will be more pro-business in cases of product liability and the like.66
II. THE SUPREME COURT CHIMES IN
Traditionally, canons of judicial ethics were designed to prevent the
most blatant types of campaigning. Judges were not supposed to
make campaign promises. But lately, these canons have come under
attack. The issue came before the Supreme Court in Republican Party
of Minnesota v. White.67 The Court's deeply divided response-a five
to four decision-did little to clarify the situation.
Minnesota has an elected judiciary, and elections are supposed to
be nonpartisan. The Minnesota Supreme Court's Code of Judicial
Conduct states that a "candidate for a judicial office" may not "an-
nounce his or her views on disputed legal or political issues. ' 68 Greg-
ory Wersal ran for associate justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court.
He "distributed literature criticizing several Minnesota Supreme
Court decisions" on various issues.69 There were complaints, and he
withdrew from the race. In 1998, he ran again, and this time he re-
64. James L. Gibson, Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme Courts: Legitimacy The-
ory and "New-Style" Judicial Campaigns, 102 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 59, 62 (2008).
65. Sample, Jones & Weiss, supra note 41, at 1.
66. See Deborah Goldberg, Interest Group Participation in Judicial Elections, in RUNNING FOR
JUDGE, supra note 27, at 73-80.
67. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
68. Id. at 768.
69. Id.
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quested an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of what had come
to be known as the "announce" clause. A bare majority of the Su-
preme Court voted to strike down the clause, finding that it violated
the First Amendment rights of candidates running for judicial office. 70
As is often true, what the case actually decided is not entirely clear.
Was this a fairly narrow holding about a specific rule in one particular
state? Or was the Supreme Court signaling a broad attack on most
rules that limited campaign speech in judicial elections? Lower courts
and state courts in recent decisions have tended to read the case
rather broadly. They may even be edging toward a fairly drastic posi-
tion: essentially, that no limit on campaign speech is allowable. 71 In
Weaver v. Bonner, George Weaver ran for election to the Georgia Su-
preme Court. He was defeated by an incumbent, Leah Sears. 72 Bon-
ner had distributed a brochure criticizing Sears; he said that she
wanted the state "to license same-sex marriages," that she "called the
electric chair 'silly,"' and that she did not accept "traditional moral
standards," but found them "pathetic and disgraceful. '73 Another tel-
evision ad claimed that Sears had "questioned the constitutionality of
laws prohibiting sex with children under fourteen. '74 A Special Com-
mittee of the bar moved to discipline Weaver.75 He hit back by filing
suit, arguing that the relevant canons and rules in Georgia were un-
constitutional. 76 The Eleventh Circuit basically agreed with him.77
The court said, in fact, that "the distinction between judicial elections
and other types of elections has been greatly exaggerated. '78 The
court read the White case to suggest that "the standard for judicial
70. Id. at 787-88.
71. See generally David Schultz, Minnesota Republican Party v. White and the Future of State
Judicial Selection, 69 ALB. L. REV. 985 (2006).
72. Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002).
73. Id. at 1316 (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. Id. at 1317.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1315. Most of the discussion turned on Canon 7 (B)(1)(d), which provided that
candidates for judicial office were not to use "any form of public communication which the
candidate knows or reasonably should know is false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, or which
contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact necessary to make the com-
munication considered as a whole not materially misleading or which is likely to create an unjus-
tified expectation about results the candidate can achieve." Id. (quoting GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(d)).
78. Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1321.
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elections should be the same as the standard for legislative and execu-
tive elections. '79
White is a fairly recent case, and nobody can be certain where lower
courts-and the Supreme Court itself-will take it. Decisions like
Weaver suggest a sweeping reading. But courts could also decide on a
narrower reading.80 This, at the moment, does not seem likely. And,
in any event, state judicial bodies have reacted in various ways to the
decision; some have interpreted it broadly, some narrowly. There
have been, apparently, some differences in the tone of campaigns in
various states.81 Whatever the flow of doctrine in the future, it seems
unlikely that courts will allow any real control over campaign speech.
This means that campaigns can continue to be raw, dirty, and negative
and that groups can continue to pour money into them.
The cases, indeed, are not encouraging to those who want greater
control over judicial campaigns. The facts of some of them are omi-
nous. In Alaska Right to Life v. Feldman, a right-to-life group had
circulated a questionnaire to Alaska judges running for re-election. 82
It was a retention-type election, so the judges had no opponents.83
The questionnaire asked the judges for their views on such things as
abortion and assisted suicide. 84 The judges refused to answer, citing
local canons on judicial ethics. 85 At this point, the plaintiffs attacked
the canons as unconstitutional. 86 The district court agreed with plain-
tiffs. 87 The appeals court reversed, but on the grounds that the chal-
lenges were not "ripe. ' 88 Kansas Judicial Watch v. Stout also involved
a questionnaire that asked about such things as gay marriage, rights of
unborn children, and the death penalty; but the questionnaire also in-
79. Id. This means, then, that only knowingly false or recklessly made false statements could
be subject to discipline. Cf. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (addressing the
conditions under which public officials could be sued for defamation).
80. See Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to that Man Behind the Robe: Judicial Elections,
the First Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y. REV. 301, 318, 327 (2003);
see also Richard L. Hasen, First Amendment Limits on Regulating Judicial Campaigns, in RUN-
NING FOR JUDGE, supra note 27, at 29-30 ("The Supreme Court was careful not to declare that
judicial election campaigns must be treated the same as other elections... White is leading states
in that direction.").
81. Rachel P. Caufield, The Changing Tone of Judicial Election Campaigns as a Result of
White, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note 27, at 39.
82. Alaska Right to Life v. Feldman, 504 F.3d 840, 843 (9th Cir. 2007). See Caufield, supra
note 81, at 39.
83. 504 F.3d at 843.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 844.
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quired whether the candidate thought that the Kansas Supreme Court
had "violated the ... State Constitution" in decisions that mandated
"specified spending levels for Kansas education funding." 89
An even more alarming questionnaire was sent out in Kentucky by
the Family Trust Foundation of Kentucky.90 The questionnaire asked
judges which former president "best represents your political philoso-
phy," Kennedy, Carter, Reagan, or Bush; which of the Rehnquist Jus-
tices "most reflects your judicial philosophy"; and whether the judge
was a "strict constructionist" or believed in the "living document ap-
proach." 91 There were also questions about human cloning, display-
ing the Ten Commandments in public buildings, and same-sex
marriage. 92 When candidates refused to answer, citing the local canon
on judicial ethics, the plaintiffs went to court in 2004-and won.93 Of
course, no candidate is forced to respond to any such questionnaires,
canon or no canon, but the groups that prepare these questionnaires
can tell the public that the judge refused to answer and let people
draw any conclusions they want from that silence.94
The groups that draft these questionnaires can argue, plausibly, that
they have a perfect right to know where the judges stand. This, after
all, is the democratic way. If you elect judges at all, you ought to be
able to make sure they have the right views; otherwise why bother
electing them? On the other hand, there is an argument for keeping
some distance between the election of members of Congress, or the
state legislature, and the election of justices for the state supreme
court.
For those who see a problem, is there an obvious solution? Would
it help to change the type of selection or election? Is the problem
most severe in partisan states and less severe in non-partisan states?
In a study published in 1978, Henry Glick concluded that "selection
systems themselves have little impact in guaranteeing that selection
procedures will be free from partisan or interest group politics. 95 But
even if this was true in the 1970s, it is quite another question whether
it is still true or will be true in the future. Judicial elections seem to be
attracting more attention, as judges seem to be more and more in the
89. Kan. Judicial Watch v. Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1217 (D. Kan. 2006) (enjoining the
enforcement of a Kansas judicial canon).
90. Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672, 711-12 (E.D. Ky. 2004).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Henry R. Glick, The Promise and the Performance of the Missouri Plan: Judicial Selection
in the Fifty States, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 509, 539 (1978).
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limelight. They are deciding more and more high profile cases. There
have always been high profile cases in this country. But their numbers
seem to be increasing. Judicial review was a judicial power rarely ex-
ercised in the mid-nineteenth century, but is extremely common to-
day. Modern media and modern election techniques may make a
difference, too. Then, there is the question of money. Common sense
suggests that judges who take campaign money from lawyers or busi-
ness interests are likely to bend in the direction of the donors, perhaps
unconsciously. The research already mentioned hints that the danger
is real. If partisan elections become more partisan, and non-partisan
elections become more contested, will money make an even greater
impact?
And what about the quality of the campaigning? Is there any way
to prevent elections and selections from becoming dirtier and more
strident? It is one thing to criticize a judge as too liberal in tort cases
or death penalty cases; it is quite another to smear the judge with vi-
cious attack ads. Certainly, elections for Congress and the Presidency
are dirty, partisan, and strident. Are judicial elections going down the
same low road?
III. PUBLIC SUPPORT AND THE COURTS
A good deal of research has explored the relationship between the
Supreme Court and public opinion. Much less work has been done on
state supreme courts and on lower courts, federal and state. The Su-
preme Court scholarship is interesting and important; but of course,
research findings about the Supreme Court do not necessarily carry
over to other courts, particularly courts with elected judges.
Scholars who study the United States Supreme Court feel that the
court's decisions "by and large correspond with public opinion. '96 On
the issues, the Justices are rarely way out in front of the general public
or way behind. And this is no surprise, because the Justices are, after
all, appointed by presidents who won popular elections. Moreover,
the Justices live in this society and breathe the same normative air as
everybody else. Hence public opinion, in the broadest sense, is a criti-
cal factor in understanding the work of the Court. The Supreme
Court in the late nineteenth century embraced racial segregation. In
the 1950s, the Court rejected it. The reasons are complex, but obvi-
ously reflect deep social changes in society, which in turn account for
changes in the work and the mindset of the Justices.
96. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL REVISITED 424 (2002).
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In the narrower sense, does public opinion actually influence the
Court's decisions, in particular cases? Does it push the Justices in a
direction they might not want to go, for fear of offending the public or
damaging the Court's reputation? These are not easy questions to an-
swer. Opinions are opaque and written for the most part in thick legal
jargon. They are hardly mirrors of what the Justices actually think.
Moreover, the Justices of the Supreme Court have life tenure and are
about as independent of the government and the electorate as judges
can possibly be. It is easy to show that the Justices, and other judges,
tend to move in the same direction as public opinion. But this is al-
most always because something, some social force, some develop-
ment, which moves public opinion, is also at the same time moving the
Court. 97 The decisions on race are one obvious example.
Research, however, also confirms what seems clear to all court-
watchers: from time to time, the Court does defy public opinion.98
Justices can sometimes afford to be bold, because adverse public opin-
ion, in most cases, has no way of impacting decisions. In the first
place, the Court is, in many ways, the most secretive and obscure
branch of government. The Justices hold no press conferences. They
never run after publicity. They deliberate in secret. In short, much of
what they do goes on beneath the radar screen.
To be sure, only important cases get to the United States Supreme
Court. But important is not the same as newsworthy. A number of
studies have explored the relationship between the Court and the me-
dia. The Supreme Court, for the most part, operates without huge
media noise. Most decisions never get reported in the newspapers,
and never make the TV evening news. For most cases, then, the Su-
preme Court can do just about whatever it wants, without the risk of
an explosive public reaction. Mostly, then, there is no overt public
opinion at all, either positive or negative.
But people do know about a small cluster of cases-the cases that
make headlines; the school segregation cases, for example, or Roe v.
Wade99 or Bush v. Gore.100 Each of these was wildly controversial and
wildly unpopular in some circles. Yet survey evidence suggests that
people hold the Supreme Court in high esteem, whatever it decides.
The Court, in other words, enjoys a high level of support.' 0 l Much of
97. Id. at 427-28.
98. Id.
99. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
100. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
101. See Craig Cummings & Robert Y. Shapiro, Can the Supreme Court Lead Public Opin-
ion? A Novel Experiment in Survey Design, PUBLIC OPINION PROS, Mar. 2006, available at http:/
/www.publicopinionpros.com/from-field/2006/mar/cummings.asp.
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this is what political scientists call "diffuse" support: this means sup-
port for the institution in general, rather than for what it does in any
particular case. Apparently, millions of people, even those who might
disapprove of the Court's general direction, still value the Court as an
institution. The Court's decisions might even move some people to
change their minds on this or that subject. 10 2
Bush v. Gore'0 3 is a particularly interesting instance. The Supreme
Court decided this case in 2000 in the feverish context of a disputed
election. The decision heavily favored George Bush and, arguably,
made him the President. It was decided by a five to four vote-five
conservatives for Bush, four liberals for Gore. Many people found the
decision outrageous, and its legal basis flimsy. Yet one study con-
ducted by a group of political scientists found, somewhat surprisingly,
that the decision had no impact whatsoever on peoples' views of the
Supreme Court and no effect on the Court's legitimacy-its firm basis
of support.10 4 Whether this is generally true of controversial opinions
is unclear. Another study found, to the contrary, that disagreement
with the Court on two high-profile cases tended to erode public confi-
dence in the Court.10 5
The study of Bush v. Gore does, however, seem somewhat plausi-
ble. Most people may support the Court, no matter what it decides in
particular cases. It is not that people agreed with the decision in Bush
v. Gore. Some did and some did not. But people support the institu-
tion. There is nothing unique about this situation. More than two-
thirds of the public during the last year of his Presidency thought that
George W. Bush was doing a rotten job.106 But would they want to
102. Id. The authors asked two groups questions about certain policy issues, for example,
"Do you favor or oppose allowing a doctor to end the patient's life?" One group was simply
asked the question. The second group was told what the Supreme Court view of the subject was.
There was a small but definite tendency on most issues, but not all, for the second group to tilt
toward the Supreme Court's view. For example, on the question of ending a patient's life, thirty-
two percent of the first group were opposed to giving the doctor this power. Id. fig.2. When told
that the Supreme Court was opposed, thirty-eight percent in the second group expressed opposi-
tion. Id.
103. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
104. James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta Spence, The Supreme Court
and the U.S. Presidential Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise, 33 BRIT. J. POL.
Sci. 535, 546 (2003).
105. Anke Grosskopf & Jeffery J. Mondak, Do Attitudes Toward Specific Supreme Court De-
cisions Matter? The Impact of Webster and Texas v. Johnson on Public Confidence in the Su-
preme Court, 51 POL. RES. Q. 633, 651 (1998). The cases in question are Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), on the constitutionality of a Missouri statute restricting
abortions, and Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), which overturned Johnson's conviction for
desecrating the flag.
106. Jeffrey Jones, Bush Approval Rating Drops to New Low of 27%, GALLOP POLL (Sept. 30,
2008).
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change the form of government? Obviously not. They did not sup-
port this particular President, but they supported the idea and the in-
stitution of the Presidency. Furthermore, people who are upset about
police brutality, behavior, or corruption do not want to get rid of po-
lice. They want change and reform.
One might recall the famous Court-packing plan, which Franklin D.
Roosevelt hatched in 1937.107 Roosevelt was at the height of his pop-
ularity. He had just won re-election in a landslide. His policies were
popular. The decisions of the Supreme Court were not. Yet his plan
to pack the Court failed miserably, and his own party deserted him on
this issue. It was one of Roosevelt's rare political defeats. Yes, the
Court was making mistakes and wrong decisions. This was
deplorable, but an attack on the Court was an attack on something
holy and fundamental. It was an attack on an institution that, right or
wrong, enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy.
Is this because of the common belief, or myth, that judges do not
make policy and that they simply decide according to the law? Cer-
tainly, anyone who wants a federal judgeship and goes before a Senate
Committee has to pretend that this is more or less the case, as we
pointed out. Judges running for office also often insist that judges
should stick to the law and that they should never legislate. Yet, no
political scientist and no serious legal scholar really believes in the
myth. Some scholars, including some political scientists, back off a
little from the "attitudinal model"; they are convinced that prece-
dents, law, and legal doctrines do at least constrain the judges. Do the
judges themselves believe in the myth? Many of them say they do,
but one wonders. 108 And, in fact, how constrained are Justices and
judges in reality? Common sense suggests that there must be some
level of constraint. But there is very little evidence to support this
common sense notion, or, for that matter, to refute it.109 What re-
search makes clear and what seems obvious simply from reading the
newspapers is that, at least in difficult, borderline cases, high court
judges react to facts according to their values and ideologies. Other-
107. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBERO, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 82-131 (1995).
108. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Judging the Judges: Some Remarks on the Way Judges Think
and the Way Judges Act, in NORMS AND THE LAW 139, 139-60 (John N. Drobak ed., 2006). Of
course, trial court and intermediate appellate judges are particularly likely to think they are
simply applying the law-and perhaps in many cases they are. See John T. Wold, Going
Through the Motions: The Monotony of Appellate Court Decision Making, 62 JUDICATURE 59,
62 (1978).
109. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 96, at 279-311.
20091
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
wise it would make no sense to talk about liberal and conservative
justices.
And what about the public? Survey research suggests that people
buy into the myth of a technocratic judiciary, at least to a certain ex-
tent. But they are also aware that ideology and political party have an
impact on decisions. 110 Is the myth a necessary pillar of the court's
legitimacy and a source of its strength? There is a strong argument
that it is, but one wonders. Millions of people surely suspect that
Democrats and Republicans are different on the bench and that liber-
als and conservatives arrive at different decisions. They have seen
money poured into judicial campaigns, and many people think that
money talks. The campaigns in the states stress policy, ideology, val-
ues, right versus left. Policy is why the judiciary (the Supreme Court,
basically) is an issue in presidential elections. The battle over nomina-
tions of men like Clarence Thomas underscores the point. But if it is
so important to know where a judge stands, and if, in the states, cam-
paigns get more and more expensive and strident-and more explicit
about policy choices-what does this do to the prevailing myth?
Of course, people can be-and are-inconsistent. Perhaps mans,
people who realize perfectly well that courts make policy draw a sharp
line between "policy," which is good (or at least unavoidable), and
"politics," which they dislike. "Politics" refers to the raw, hateful par-
tisanship of campaigns and elected officials. It is associated with
wheeling and dealing, and with the pandering and lying that is often a
feature of electoral politics. The Supreme Court, then, can and does
make "policy" but ideally it does so free from the taint of "politics."
This is a plausible way to look at public support for the Supreme
Court. In any event, the Court has at its command a rich store of
legitimacy. Even when confidence in the Court is "shaken by contro-
versial rulings," in time, perhaps, "just as a river cleanses itself," the
lost support gets "regenerated." ''
But even if all this is true of the Supreme Court, how far can we
generalize to other courts? The Supreme Court is the highest and
most visible court in the land, and it is not an elected body. How
much can we extrapolate from the Supreme Court to state supreme
courts-or to trial courts?
State courts and lower courts have much less of that rich reservoir
of diffuse support. These judges do not enjoy life tenure. In most
110. John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, The Myth of Legality and Public Evaluation of the
Supreme Court, 81 Soc. Sci. Q. 928, 937-38 (2000).
111. Jeffery J. Mondak & Shannon Ishiyama Smithey, The Dynamics of Public Support for the
Supreme Court, 59 J. POL. 1114, 1124 (1997).
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states they are elected and re-elected. And, as we have seen, there is
danger that these courts are slowly sinking into a swamp of partisan-
ship. Changes in election habits are convincing more and more peo-
ple that judges are for sale. And perhaps, in a sense, they are. As we
saw, there is some evidence that money contributions made a differ-
ence, at least in one state. More subtly, raw public opinion may bend
the behavior of judges. One study found that in states with elected
judges, where the public strongly supported the death penalty, appel-
late judges were much "less likely to reverse the death penalty" than
in states with "less support for capital punishment" or in courts with
appointed judges. 112
So far, many judges in many states have seemed able to avoid these
pitfalls and stay clear of the swamp of partisanship. But the trends are
not encouraging. Judicial elections are bound to get more expensive.
All elections are becoming more expensive and, perhaps, more
heated. This is the age of television: an age of images. Swing voters
shift from this party to that, and not so much on the basis of ideology
or policy, as on the basis of whether they like the candidate, whether
the candidate has "charisma," whether the candidate is religious,
whether he or she has a nice family life, and so forth. This puts enor-
mous weight on how the candidates project themselves. Policy too is
reduced to soundbites and images: soft on crime or not soft, conserva-
tive or liberal activist or strict constructionist. But images, especially
on television, are dramatically expensive. The money has to come
from somewhere. It often has strings attached. Money, after all, buys
influence. It can work its mischief in subtle ways.
Trends in elections-in congressional elections, senatorial elections,
presidential elections-are likely to affect judicial elections as well.
More and more money, more TV ads, more internet blogging, more
ruckus, more heat, more partisanship. This trend is arguably destruc-
tive with regard to all elections. For judges, it has special dangers.
Partisanship could put the legitimacy of the courts at risk. Even more
seriously, it could put justice itself at risk.
112. Paul Brace & Brent D. Boyea, Judicial Selection Methods and Capital Punishment in the
American States, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note 27, at 199.
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